. Although negative long-run EEO effects are consistent with certain microeconomic predictions (Heckman and Wolpin, 1976) 2, the coincide~ce of much of this six-year period with a cyclical decline in economic activity suggested that those effects . h h b d b ' d·' 3 mlg t ave een cause y macroeconomlC con ltlons.
A recession can erode gains and impede progress toward EEO goals by increasing the monetary and psychic costs that firms complying with EEO laws face. If such costs vary inversely with cyclical changes in economic activity, then we should find a pro-cyclical pattern in firm compliance.
Compliance by firms also depends directly upon the expected costs of violating the law. Firms' costs vary with their (1) probability of getting caught violating the law and (2) probability of paying a penalty once caught.
In 1972, amendments to Title VII increased these expected costs; a discrete 2 change in the effects of these probabilities in 1972 can capture the amendments' impact.
4 A continuous change in the effec~s of these probabilities over time can capture the interaction between compliance costs and the business cycle. Upon this framework, we can build an econometric model. Its estimates show the effect of Title VII on earnings in 1968 through 1974 to be inversely re1~ted to the aggregate unemployment rate. These results confirm that macroeconomic conditions can alter the effects of social programs, a fact which analysts must take into account.
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS ON COMPLIANCE WITH EEO LAWS
As aggregate economic conditions worsen, the cost to firms of compliance with EEO laws increases for two reasons. First, in a recession, both the demand for labor and voluntary turnover are reduced, costing the firm more to attain a given increase in its female/male employment ratio. And second, more intense competition for fewer jobs makes male workers and unions more likely to resist the hiring and promotion of women workers.
At full employment increased demand creatrs new jobs and new vacancies when employees leave for better jobs. To comply with EEO laws, firms can then increase their employment ratio of women to men by including a high proportion of women among the new hires. In a recession new jobs are created more slowly and individuals change jobs less frequently. Firms then find it harder to increase the female/male employment ratio; they can fill all job vacancies with women, further reducing the number of positions available to men or resort to layoffs. Laying off a worker means that the firm loses its investment in him, whether it includes only fixed hiring costs or hiring and training costs. If firms first layoff workers in whom they have the smallest investment, then, as the recession deepens, they incur an increasing loss by replacing a current (male) employee with a new (female) employee. Clearly, the weaker the economy the more it will cost firms to increase the female/male employment ratio.
Not only will the same increase in employment ratios cost employers more, but also male employees and labor market institutions such as unions will resist it more. The fewer his alternative opportunities, the more likely a male worker will resist losing a job to a female. This explains the recent increase in charges of reverse discrimination. Many male workers, however, need not act on their own; unions and seniority systems impose institutional constraints on hiring and promoting women, particularly new entrants. Furthermore, these constraints are more likely to be binding during a recession.
Economic conditions will affect the long-run as well as the shortrun impact that enforcing EEO laws can have on the position of minorities and women. Employers first layoff workers in whom they have the smallest investment, usually new hires. Employee resistance, unions, and seniority systems also protect the position of older employees. Thus, the last hired in a prosperous economy will be the first fired when 'economic conditions worsen.
If compliance with the law costs more when economic conditions weaken, then a given amount of enforcement will induce less compliance. Both the scope of settlements reached and the extent to which firms adhere to them will be reduced. Consequently, enforcing EEO laws will increase the demand for women relative to men by less in a recession, and will increase female earnings and narrow the earnings differential by less as well.
4
Even if the extent of compliance were not reduced, enforcing EEO laws in a recession would increase earnings by less (or reduce them by more). In the attendant loose labor market there are fewer employment opportunities. Because firms need not bid women away from oth~r alternatives, they can increase their female/male employment ratio without increasing female wages. And a given increase in that ratio is more likely to displace male workers, t~nding to reduce male wages by more than in a tight labor market.
In summary, the impact of enforcing Title VII is hypothesized to depend upon aggregate economic conditions because the costs of complying with the law will vary inversely with cyclical changes in economic activity.
Fewer firms will comply with Title VII when it costs more to do so; for those that do comply, the scope of and degree of adherence to conciliated and litigated s~ttl~ments will be reduced. Thus, a given level of enforcement will increase the demand for women relative to men by less in a recession than otherwise, tending to increase the wages of women by less. For a given increase in relative demand, the increase in women's wages is further limited because there are few alternative employment opportunities. Because there are fewer opportunities, enforcement is also more likely to displace men from jobs than it would at full employment.
As a result, enforcing Title VII is expected to increase female wages by less and to reduce male wages by more during a recession than at full employment.
AN ESTIMATION MODEL
In this Aection, we develop an econometric model to test the " 5 impact of cyclical variation in economic activity on year to year differences in the effect of Title VII on the sex differential in earnings.
To estimate the effects from 1968 through 1974, the model pools time series and cross sections and allows unrestricted year coefficients on the Title VII enforcement variables. Then to estimate the impact of cyclical variation in economic activity on these yearly effects, the model restricts them to a linear function of the inverse of the aggregate unemployment rate. By using that rate to measure the aggregate level of economic activity, we follow the convention established by previous studies (e.g., Ashenfelter, 1970; Vroman, 1975) .
The unrestricted (1) and the restricted (2) versions of the model may be written as follows:
where, lnW = natural logarithm of real weekly earnings for individual, I
aggregate unemployment rate in year t, where t is the year in which individual I appears in the sample We test the following hypotheses,
: The aggregate unemployment rate does not account for all of the year to year differences in the effect of enforcement on earnings.
. The aggregate unemployment rate accounts for none of the year to year differences in the effect of enforcement on earnings.
against the alternative hypotheses,
The aggregate unemployment rate accounts for all of the year to year differences in the effect of enforcement on earnings.
The aggregate unemployment rate accounts for some of the year to year differences in the effect of enforcement on earnings: The higher the unemployment rate, the less positive the effect.
To test H O against HI' whether or not the unemployment rate accounts for all of the year to year differences, we compute an F-test by subtracting the error sum of squares of equation (2) from that of equation (1).
* *
In order to test HI againstH o ' whether or not the unemployment rate accounts for some of the year to year differences, we need unbiased estimates of the interaction between enforcement and the unemployment rate. But the effect of enforcement is expected to grow over time, and the unemployment rate trended upward during the period studied; hence, their interaction could pick up that common trend. Thus to avoid spurious estimates, we add a time trend to the enforcement variables, rewriting the restricted equation as follows:
Since these individuals differ from year to year, the The mean probability of successful settlement is .508 pre-amendment and .542 post-amendment. These data were obtained from the compliance files of the EEOC. The effects of pre-and post-amendment enforcement show differences in timing but similarity in direction, with the exception of pre-amendment settlements. Post-amendment investigations and settlements both increase the earnings of white females and neither decreases the earnings of white males (Table 1) ; the effect of investigations begins immediately and grows over time, while the effect of settlements· appears in 1974. Pre-amendment as well as Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. The set of numbers in the following pairs of columns are from the same equation: (1) and (3), (2) and (4), (5) and (7), and (6) and (8).
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
post-amendment investigations increase female earnings; by contrast, however, the effect appears only with a lag in 1971. From then on, fairly steady growth results in a sizable positive long-run impact by 1974 (see Table 1 , columns 1 and 2). In contrast, the coefficient of pre-amendment investigations on male earnings fluctuates from year to year, showing no clear effect (Table 1 , columns 5 and 6). This question is answered by examining estimates of equations (2) and (3), which both restrict the effect of Title VII to be a linear function of the inverse of the aggregate unemployment rate. The estimates in equation (2) of aI' (31' and (32 appear in the Appendix, negative effect on earnings is explained by variation in the aggregate unemployment ,rate. As hypothesized, the relationship is inverse (Table 2, columns 3 and 6). The positive coefficients on PREENF *l/UNEMPL imply that increasing the unemployment rate makes the effect of settlements less positive (or more negative). Its effect on female earnings, .0048 (l/UNEMPL), is twice as sensitive to the inverse of the unemployment rate as its effect on male earnings, .0024 (1/UNEMPL).8 Some firms violate the law despite that information. Individuals file charges against them, leading to conciliated or litigated settlements.
For these firms, the expected marginal costs of violating the law must be less than or equal to their marginal costs of complying with it.
Then, small increases in the latter, induced by increases in the unemployment rate, create even greater inequality in marginal costs, causing firms to react. Therefore, the outcomes of and extent of adherence to settlements, as well as their effect on earnings, should depend upon the unemployment rate. The pt0pottip~of settlements that the EEOC successfully conciliates is one indicator. And data show that as the average unemployment rate increased from 4.475 to 5.367 percent between the pre-and post-amendment periods, the proportion of all private sector settlements conciliated successfully dropped from .646 to .577 (Beller, forthcoming) .
THE EFFECT OF TITLE VII AT ALTERNATIVE UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
In order to see how the effectiveness of Title VII was restricted by its sensitivity to the business cycle, we have computed the effects of pre-amendment settlements and of Title VII at the actual and at several alternative unemployment rates. Table 3 presents these effects for both the short-run t Source: Tables 1 and 2. 18 (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) and the long-run (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) . Settlements' effects (columns 2-4) are computed as the difference between the function in the later year, taken from Table 2 , and the coe£ficient in the pre-enforcement year, taken from line 1 of Table 1 . The short-run effect of Title VII (all enforcement measures, columns 5-7) sums the short-run coefficient differences of pre-amendment settlements and investigations, evaluated at their respective means; similarly, the long-run e£fect sums the long-run coefficient differences of pre-amendment settlements and investigations as well as the short-run coefficient differences of post-amendment settlements and investigations.
The long-run negative effect that pre-amendment settlements had on female earnings is a consequence not of enforcement itself, but rather of worsening economic conditions following those settlements. Had the unemployment rate been but one percentage point lower, 4.6 percent in 1974, pre-amendment settlements would have increased not reduced female earnings in the long run (Table 3, (Table 3 , column 5).
While the increase in the unemployment rate eroded any gains that women may have made from pre-amendment enforcement, the higher rate of the 2 . According to the Heckman-Wolpin model, in the long run, an employment quota increases the firm's costs of production and (a sex quota) reduces the employment of men, and possibly of women, below the pre-quota equilibrium. The reduction in employment tends to reduce their wages.
3 Some economists have argued that the recession of the 1970s eroded gains minorities made due to the social legislation of the 1960s (see, e.g., Wallace, 1976) .
4The costs of violating the law, which are weighted by the probabi1i-ties to determine expected costs, may include lawyer's fees and court.,costs, large back-pay settlements, and substantial changes in hiring and other personnel practices. This study assumes they are constant across firms and over time for a specific violation. The 1972 amendments to Title VII increased the probability that a firm found violating the law would pay any of these costs; they did so by granting the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) the right to sue private sector respoudents if conciliation attempts failed. 5If these constraints did not hold, the results would be biased toward finding no relationship between the effect of enforcement and the unemployment rate; hence, we adopt them for computational convenience.
6
The sample is restricted to whites only to reduce the size of the cross-products matrix by eliminating race interaction terms. 7 Computing the effect of enforcement as a coefficient difference nets out any preexisting relationship between variation in enforcement and in earnings across states. l~e can make statements about gains and losses in earnings, but not in welfare. To do so, we would need to know the impact of Title VII on employment, which is difficult to estimate for intercensal years.
It could also be misleading to make strong time-series statements from these primarily cross-section results. Nevertheless, by contrasting post-amendment 27 with pre-amendment enforcement our results provide some idea, at least about direction, of the change in Title VII's effects over timel 2Ironically, an increase in the unemployment rate causes the male/female earnings differential to narrow as well; this occurs because male earnings are more cyclically sensitive than female earnings. The 2 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate between 1968 and 1974, from 3.6 to 5.6 percent, caused the sex differential to narrow by 8 percent.
